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ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Town argues that this case "centers" on a municipality's purported right to 
"exercise its discretion on behalf of its residents in determining if, when, and how to repair 
the roads within it municipal boundaries." Appellee's Brief at p. 11. The Town's argument 
is, however, misplaced. This case, in fact, centers upon the issue of whether a Utah court 
has the authority to compel a municipality to perform a mandatory, nondiscretionary, and 
nondelegable duty, particularly where the municipality's failure or refusal to perform such 
duty causes the deprivation of a judicially recognized right held by the party seeking to 
compel performance of that duty. 
The Trial Court concluded upon its review of the evidence presented at trial that the 
Road at issue in this case is the only reasonable route currently available to Appellants by 
which they can access their properties. It therefore granted Appellants the right to use the 
Road for purposes such purpose. This Court has repeatedly and uniformly held for more than 
100 years that every municipality in Utah owes a mandatory and nondiscretionary duty to 
repair and maintain the roads under its jurisdiction and control in a reasonably safe and 
useable condition. Despite the duty to maintain, the Town has flatly refused to maintain or 
make any repairs to the Road at issue in this case, which is indisputably under its jurisdiction 
and control and which, as the Town readily admits, is in significant disrepair and in a 
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substantially dangerous condition. The Town's failure to perform its duty to maintain the 
Road not only impedes (and threatens to destroy) Appellants' right to use the Road to access 
their properties, but also poses to them a serious risk of injury and damage. In order to 
preserve their right to safely use the Road to access their properties, Appellants have 
requested that the Town be required pursuant to Rule 65B to perform its duty to maintain the 
Road. The Town's claim as to the focus of this case, ignores all of the foregoing issues and 
facts. 
In response to Appellants' arguments in favor of their petition, the Town presents 
four arguments which it claims demonstrate that the Appellants are not entitled to relief 
under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. First, the Town argues that 
Appellants lack standing to pursue relief under Rule 65B. Second, the Town contends that 
Appellants' petition for relief under Rule 65B fails to satisfy the standard established for 
granting such relief. Third, the Town argues that even if Appellants met all of the 
conditions for obtaining relief under Rule 65B, Utah law does not grant a court authority to 
compel municipalities to perform the duty to maintain their roads in a safe and useable 
condition. Finally, the Town asserts that regardless of whether it has a mandatory duty to 
maintain its roads in a safe condition, it cannot be compelled to perform such duty because it 
lacks the funds necessary for such performance. Each of the Town's argument's are 
addressed below. 
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II. APPELLANTS HAVE STANDING TO PURSUE RELIEF UNDER RULE 65B 
The Town's first argument is that Appellants lack standing to pursue relief under 
Rule 65B. The Town correctly notes that it has not disputed Appellants standing in this case 
until now. Indeed, from commencement of this action through the close of trial, Appellants 
have pursued their claims with presumptive and unchallenged standing to do so, which fact 
strongly indicates that neither the parties nor the Trial Court, at any time during this case, 
found any reason or necessity to directly address, or even question, Appellants' standing. 
Nevertheless, since, as the Town correctly notes, the issue of standing can be raised at any 
time, even sua sponte, Appellants refer the Court to the Record in this case which is replete 
with evidence that Appellants have met the requirements for standing to pursue relief under 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure set forth in each of the three alternative tests 
for establishing standing annunciated by this Court. 
Under the first (or "traditional") test for establishing standing, Appellants must have 
"suffered or will 'suffer[] some distinct and palpable injury that gives [Appellants] a 
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.'" Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah 
Air Quality Board (i(Sierra Club"), 2006 UT 73, f 12, 148 P.3d 975 (alteration in original). 
The Town argues that Appellants have failed to establish or even allege that they have 
suffered a particular injury which directly resulted from the condition of the Road and thus 
have not established standing under the traditional test. The Town's exceedingly narrow 
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interpretation of what constitutes a "particular injury" under the traditional test and its 
argument that Appellants have failed to allege or demonstrate such an injury lack merit 
The Town acknowledges in its Brief, among other things, that: (1) "[f]or years 
preceding the Town's incorporation, Appellants used the Road as their primary access to 
their farm properties" Appellee's Brief at p. 6; (2) "Appellants do not find [the Alternative 
Route] to be an acceptable alternative for access to their farm properties" id. at p. 7; and (3) 
in their Amended Complaint, "Appellants alleged their dissatisfaction with the Alternative 
Route as well as general harm they would incur if the weight limitation ordinance were 
enforced." Id. at p. 9. The Town argues, however, that despite these particular allegations, 
Appellants failed to allege standing because their Amended Complaint contained no 
allegation that "they had suffered or would suffer any injury as a result of the condition of 
the Road." Id. The Town apparently hopes that by calling the harm that Appellants alleged 
in their Amended Complaint (and demonstrated at both the preliminary injunction hearing 
and trial) would result if they were not permitted to use the Road to access their farms for 
any reason, including prohibition under the Town's weight limitation ordinance, a "general 
harm," the Court will automatically accept the Town's characterization of such harm, ignore 
the Record in this case, and make no inquiry into whether Appellants have alleged any 
particular injury. The Town has, however, failed to cite to anything in the Record or case 
law that either supports or explains its baseless and ill-founded assertion the harm asserted 
by Appellants in this case constitutes "general harm" only and is insufficient to demonstrate 
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standing under the traditional test. 
A review of the Record in this case clearly and unequivocally establishes that 
Appellants initiated this action and sought (and are seeking) the relief it has requested for the 
central purpose of protecting their right to use the Road to access their farm properties. The 
other fundamental purpose of this action for Appellants was to avoid, through the 
preservation of their right to use the Road, suffering the ruinous and irreparable injury that 
would result to each of their businesses if Appellants were unable to use the Road or, as a 
result, access their properties. Every action taken by Appellants in this case or in connection 
with this case has been consistent with these central purposes. 
Therefore, when the Town enacted its weight limitation ordinance which had the 
effect of preventing Appellants' lawful use of the Road, Appellants sought and obtained a 
preliminary injunction preventing the Town's enforcement of the ordinance while the parties 
conducted discovery and prepared for trial thus allowing Appellants to continue their use of 
the Road uninterrupted. These purposes also served as the basis for Appellants' offer to the 
Town, shortly after obtaining the preliminary injunction, to pay for the costs of the repairs 
needed to the Road. They are also the reason why Appellants argued to the Trial Court that 
the sole alternative route available to Appellants was in an unusable condition and failed to 
meet the requirements of a "reasonable alternative route" under Utah law. Importantly, 
recognizing that their efforts to have the Town's weight limitation ordinance declared 
invalid would be meaningless if thereafter the Town, through its inaction, permitted the 
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Road to deteriorate into such a condition that Appellants could no longer use it to access 
their properties, Appellants amended their Complaint and added their petition that the Town 
be compelled to perform its mandatory duty to maintain the Road. Accordingly, 
preservation of their right to use the Road and avoidance of the irreparable injuries that 
would befall Appellants if their efforts for such preservation failed, constitute the sole 
reasons that Appellants amended their Complaint in order to add its petition for relief under 
Rule 65B. These facts are clear from even a cursory review of the Record in this case. 
The Town simply cannot in good faith argue that the goal and intent of all of 
Appellants' actions in connection with the case have been for any other purpose than those 
described above. Thus, while Appellants' Amended Complaint may not, in specific terms, 
state that "the particular injury Appellants have or will suffer is ," a review of the 
Record indisputably and unequivocally establishes that Appellants have consistently and 
continually alleged and asserted throughout the course of this case that if they are prevented 
from using the Road (either by (a) the Town's weight limitation ordinance or (b) (as later 
claimed) the Town's failure to perform its clear legal duty to repair and maintain the Road 
which failure results in the Road deteriorating into such a condition that is no longer 
traversable or is use is otherwise rendered too unsafe) they will suffer irreparable damage 
because they will have no reasonable access to their Road (and no reasonable alternative 
route exists). Despite the Town's contrary claim, the harm alleged and established by 
Appellants is distinct, palpable, particular and clear and the personal stake of each Appellant 
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in this case is beyond refute. The Court should thus uphold Appellants standing in this case 
which has, for good reason, not been disputed by any of the participants hereof until now. 
Even if Appellants could not demonstrate that they have standing in this case under 
the traditional test, this Court has also recognized that standing may be demonstrated if "no 
one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be 
raised at all unless that particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue." Terracor v. Utah 
Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986). The Trial Court's 
findings in this case, as contained in its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (the 
"Findings and Conclusions") demonstrate that Appellants have standing under this second 
test. In particular, the Trial Court found that: 
• "[After about four blocks] the Road leaves the primary residential area of 
the Town, continues East for more than one-half mile, makes a large 'S' turn 
and then continues East for approximately one and one-half miles more," 
Findings and Conclusions at Tf 9 [R. at 522.]. 
• "[Appellants] have used the Road as their primary access to their farm 
properties from State Road 73," id. at |21 [R. at 520]. 
• "Since the preliminary injunction hearing in October and November 2005, 
the Town has not spent any money nor invested any time or labor in 
maintaining the Road after it leaves the primary residential area of the Town. 
Because the Road has not been maintained, it has deteriorated considerably 
since the preliminary injunction hearing," id. at \ 33 [R. at 518] (emphasis 
added). 
• "[T]he Town asserts that [Appellants] have another access form [stet] State 
Road 73: Eagle Mountain Boulevard .... (hereafter referred to as the 
"Alternative Route")," id. at t 22 [R. at 520], and thus concluded that: 
• "Based on the condition of the Alternative Route and the needs of the 
Plaintiffs, the Alternative Route is not a reasonable alternative to Plaintiffs' 
/ 
need to use the Road," id. at t 7 [R. at 512]. 
Thus, the Findings and Conclusions establish that: (1) Appellants have been the 
principal users of the majority of the Road, (2) because there is no other a reasonable 
alternative route, the Road is the exclusive means by which Appellants may access their 
properties and Appellants therefore have a right to use the Road, and (3) because the Town 
has failed and refused to conduct any repairs on the Road, it has deteriorated considerably 
since 2005. Collectively, these facts demonstrate that Appellants have the greatest interest 
in the outcome of the issues presented in this case and thus have standing to pursue their 
claims. 
The residents of the Town only regularly use, at most, the roughly four blocks upon 
entry to the Town from State Highway 73. It is beyond dispute that the remaining larger 
portion of the Road is used almost solely by Appellants, who also regularly and continually 
use portion of the Road used by the Town's residents. Thus, with regard to the greater 
portion located beyond the residential areas of the Town, Appellants are indisputably the 
ones most directly affected by the Road's serious disrepair. Because, as the Trial Court 
found, Appellants must use the Road to access their properties, Appellants possess the 
greatest interest in the outcome of an action directed at compelling the repair and 
maintenance of the Road. The Town's residents' interest in the repair and maintenance of 
the Road, which they use, at most, sporadically, is nowhere near as strong. Indeed, the 
Town has made no indication appearing in the Record or elsewhere that its residents even 
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care if the Road is maintained. Thus, the Town can point to nothing in the Record which 
supports its statement that its residents have a greater interest in the Road than the 
Appellants. The Record simply provides no justification or support to such assertion. 
Appellants can therefore demonstrate that they also have standing under the second test. 
The third standing test allows the Court to find standing if "the issues are unique and 
of such great public importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public 
interest", even if the first two prongs are not met. Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f 20. In this 
case we have seen petitions for amicus briefs seeking to be on both sides of the case, clearly 
evidencing a serious issue of public importance. It can be further noted that this Court 
decided to hear this matter rather than referring it to the Court of Appeals, generally an 
indication that important principals are at stake. When a municipality's refusal to perform a 
duty imposed upon it by the law has the effect of jeopardizing citizen safety, denying the 
property rights of a group of individuals, and likely destroying their businesses, such refusal 
poses an extremely important public issue. This issue appears to be one of first impression 
in this State and deserves to be heard. 
In short, to claim that the Appellants did not have standing to raise the instant matter 
is to ignore everything asserted by Appellants and found by the Trial Court below. The 
Court should therefore find that the Town's argument lacks merit and that Appellants 
continue to clearly have standing to pursue their claims in this matter, including their 
petition for relief under Rule 65B. 
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III. THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANTS' PETITION IS OF THE NATURE 
AND MEETS THE STANDARDS OF RELIEF AVAILABLE UNDER RULE 65B. 
Various sections of Appellee's Brief severely mischaracterize Appellants' requested 
remedy in attempt to redefine Appellants' position in a way that makes it easier for the Town 
to defeat. The straw man the Town has selected is to suggest that Appellants ask the Court 
to force the Town to perform the repairs on the Road in a manner dictated by Appellants. 
That is not the case, and in fact is contrary to the manifest position taken by Appellants at 
every stage of these proceedings. Far from seeking to dictate spending allocations or 
legislative functions, Appellants merely ask the Court to require the Town to make the Road 
safe through reasonable repairs thereof. 
In seeking to understand the purpose of this mischaracterization, it is important for 
the Court to see the underlying aims of the Town in this matter. Since the beginning of this 
dispute, the Town has maintained a deliberate effort to drive Appellants away. Refusing to 
repair the Road is, following the Trial Court's ruling that Appellants have a right to use the 
Road, merely the only remaining tactic available to the Town in pursuing this quest. This 
was the purpose the Town's imposition of weight restrictions on the Road, just as it is the 
purpose of their deliberate refusal to make any repairs to same. The Town has failed to 
make any repairs to the Road during the entire time it has been incorporated as a Town. 
In furtherance of this aim, the Town also completely ignores or mischaracterizes 
efforts of Appellants to provide funding for repairs on the Road. Appellees now take the 
unsupported position that Appellants wanted to perform the road repairs themselves. This is 
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completely contrary to all documentary and testimonial evidence presented in this case, as 
well as the findings of the Trial Court below. In the proposal at issue, Appellants wished to 
provide some funding to the Town for it to perform reasonable repairs to the Road, using 
someone who had already had permission to make repairs thereto. There was nothing in any 
of the material submitted in response to the Appellants' offer of payment that indicated that 
Appellants insisted on or even suggested doing the repairs themselves. Rather than 
accepting these funds and performing reasonable repairs to the Road, the Town absolutely 
refused to make any repairs unless Appellants agreed to pay for a completely new heavy 
duty road to replace the existing Road. Given the Town's history of attempting to chase 
Appellants away from the Town, it is questionable whether the Town would have followed 
through with this plan even if Appellants agreed to pay for the Road. 
IV. UTAH LAW IMPOSES UPON MUNICIPALITIES A CLEAR, MANDATORY 
DUTY TO MAINTAIN AND REPAIR THEIR STREETS IN A SAFE AND 
USEABLE CONDITION THE PERFORMANCE OF WHICH CAN BE 
COMPELLED THROUGH RULE 65B 
A. Contrary to the Town's Argument, Utah's Statutes Do Not State that the 
Duty to Maintain Is a Discretionary Duty 
As its initial argument, the Town relies on Utah's Municipal Code in an attempt to 
demonstrate that Utah law does not impose upon a municipality a clear, mandatory duty to 
maintain and repair its roads in a safe and useable condition. In particular, the Town points 
to language in contained in section 10-8-8 of the Utah Municipal Code, which the Town 
argues grants municipalities the "discretionary" responsibility to make "decisions regarding 
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all road improvements" See Appellee's Brief at p. 22 (emphasis added). Section 10-8-8 
provides, in relevant part: 
A municipal legislative body may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, 
narrow, extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve [its] streets... 
U.C.A., § 10-8-8. The Town's reliance on section 10-8-8 is misplaced for the following 
several reasons. 
First, the Town apparently ignores the fact that conspicuously absent from section 10-
8-8's language is any mention whatsoever that a municipality also "may" "maintain" or 
"repair" its roads. Appellants do not dispute the Town's assertion that it possesses the 
discretionary right under section 10-8-8 to "improve" its roads. This discretionary right to 
"improve" its roads does not, however, transform its mandatory duty to maintain and repair 
its roads into a discretionary one. The Town has not, and cannot, point to any language in 
section 10-8-8, the Utah Municipal Code, or elsewhere in the law that provides in this 
context that the terms "maintain" and/or "repair" are subsumed in the meaning of the term 
"improve." 
Second, the Town also apparently ignores (or is unaware of) the fact that this Court 
has, in numerous decisions dating back more than a century, expressly explicated the clear 
distinction between a municipality's duty to improve and its duty to maintain and repair and 
uniformly held that while a municipality possesses the right under Utah's Municipal Code to 
exercise discretion regarding whether or not to improve a road within its boundaries, once it 
12 
has exercised its discretion and improved such a road, the municipality thereafter has a 
mandatory duty to maintain that road in a safe and useable condition. 
For example, in Morris v. Salt Lake City, 101 P. 373 (Utah 1909) this Court noted 
that "under the statutes of this State," a municipality is authorized "to exercise [its] own 
judgment in establishing street or sidewalk grades and in formulating plans for 
improvements of that or any other public character." Id. at 376. It further noted that 
because the state had "intrusted such work to the municipal authorities, the court cannot 
impose upon them its own ideas of utility, taste, or beauty." Id. The Court therefore found 
that "[t]he courts may not control the city in the exercise of its rights in making public 
improvements, nor can the courts ordinarily review the actions of the city authorities in their 
determination of what the improvement shall be and how its plans shall be executed. Nor is 
the city liable for any defect in planning a public improvement." Id. 
The Court then, however, made a clear distinction between this discretionary duty to 
make improvements and a municipality's mandatory duty to maintain its streets. In 
particular, the Court found that it is "the primary duty of the city to exercise reasonable care 
to maintain the streets in a reasonably safe condition and to guard against injury to persons 
and property by removing or making reasonably safe any dangerous objects in the streets" 
and that such duty is "constant, continuing, and nondelegable." Id. at 377. The Court 
noted that under this duty, if a "mere stranger" had caused damage to a city's street or placed 
a dangerous object in that street, "it would have been the duty of the city to exercise 
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reasonable diligence to discover it, and to exercise ordinary care to remove it or to make it 
reasonably safe." Id. at 378. It thus concluded that in contrast to the duty to improve, 
wherewith a court had no authority to control or review a city's performance of such duty, a 
court could hold a city liable for failing to discharge its duty to maintain its streets in a safe 
condition. Id. 
Later, in Rollow v. Ogden City, 243 P. 791, 794 (Utah 1926), the Court reiterated the 
distinction between the two duties, and held that 
Nothing is more clearly or better settled than that in locating and opening 
streets and in regulating travel thereon within the limits of incorporated 
cities and towns they exercise a discretionary power. It is, however, equally 
well settled that in maintaining the public streets and highways within the 
limits of such cities and towns a positive legal duty is imposed to maintain 
them in a reasonably safe condition for travel. 
Id. at 794 (emphasis added); see also Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 111 P.2d 800, 803-04 (Utah 
1941) (holding that Utah statutes "do not authorize recovery from a municipality for the 
negligence of its servants engaged in repairing or constructing streets, but only where there 
has been a failure on the part of the municipality to perform its duty to keep its streets free 
from unsafe, dangerous, defective or obstructed conditions."). 
Finally, the Court more recently upheld the distinction between the duties in 
Braithwaite v. West Valley City, 860 P.2d 336 (Utah 1993), where it noted that while "it has 
long been the law in Utah (going back to its territorial era) that a municipality has a duty to 
exercise ordinary care to keep streets which it has opened for travel and which it has invited 
the public to use in a reasonably safe condition for travel," no Utah court has held that "a 
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municipality in discharging its obligation to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe 
condition for travel is obligated to build sidewalks for pedestrian travel." Id. at 338. In 
making its distinction between the two duties, the Court cited section 10-8-8 and noted that 
"the statute was drawn to authorize but not require the building of sidewalks." Id. The 
Court then summarized its holding by again marking the distinction between the 
discretionary duty to improve and the mandatory duty to maintain, stating that "neither our 
statutes nor our case law has ever required that a municipality build sidewalks to meet its 
legal duty of providing reasonably safe conditions for pedestrian travel on its streets." Id. at 
339. 
An additional problem with the Town's reading of section 10-8-8 is that it also 
ignores the fact that the Utah Legislature has, pursuant to section 63-30d-301(3)(a)(i) of 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act"), waived immunity for a municipality's 
failure to fulfill its duty to maintain its roads in a safe and useable condition. Liability under 
the Act is not imposed on a municipality for damages that result either during its 
discretionary performance of the duty to maintain or the discretionary manner in which it 
performed such duty. Instead, the sole basis for liability under section 63-30d-301(3)(a)(i) is 
the "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition" of, among other things, a road under the 
control and jurisdiction of the municipality, which condition is caused by (or is a result of) 
the municipality's failure to fulfill its duty to maintain such road in a safe and useable 
condition. 
-i r 
ID 
In this regard, the Court explained in Trapp v. Salt Lake City, 835 P.2d 161 (Utah 
1992), that "[f]or almost a century, Utah statutes have implicitly recognized" the duty 
imposed upon municipalities to maintain their "streets in a reasonably safe condition" by, 
among other things, "conferring upon persons who have been injured or damaged as a result 
of a city or town's failure to fulfill this duty the right to present a claim for such injuries or 
damages." Id. at 161-62. If the duty to maintain was, as the Town argues, truly a 
discretionary duty, it would be grossly unfair and inconsistent for the Legislature or this 
Court to then impose liability on a municipality that determined, in its discretion, to refuse, 
forego, or delay the performance of that duty. The Town has made no attempt to explain 
this contradiction to the Court except to disregard the Act as irrelevant because it pertains to 
claims of negligence rather than a court's enjoinment of a municipal duty. Regardless of the 
primary purpose of the Act, it does, as this Court noted in Trapp, "implicitly recognize" the 
duty to maintain and by its terms demonstrates that the duty is not discretionary. 
As demonstrated above, the Town's reliance on section 10-8-8 is misplaced and its 
argument that Utah statutes define the duty to maintain as discretionary duty entirely lack 
merits. Moreover, Appellants' argument that "nothing in the [Utah] Code provides that a 
municipality 'may' be responsible for the ... maintenance of [its] streets" is not, as the Town 
contends, "disingenuous." What is disingenuous is the Town's misleading, "red herring" 
argument that attempts to redefine and broaden the meaning of the term "improve" to 
include the term "to maintain in a safe condition" in order to bootstrap (and somehow 
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convert) its mandatory duty to maintain its roads into its discretionary duty to improve its 
roads. Again, nothing in section 10-8-8 or elsewhere in the Utah Code provides that a 
municipality "may" maintain or repair its roads once such roads have been improved by the 
municipality. Likewise, contrary to the Town's assertion, Appellants did not simply 
"ignore" section 10-8-8 in their Opening Brief. Appellants made no reference to section 10-
8-8 because, as thoroughly established above, it is irrelevant to the Town's mandatory duty 
to maintain and repair its roads. 
B. Contrary to the Town's Argument, Performance of the Common Law 
Mandatory Duty to Maintain May be Compelled Through Mandamus-Type 
Relief 
The Town next argues that while Appellants "correctly note" that this Court has 
repeatedly held that Utah municipalities have a duty to maintain their streets in a safe an 
useable condition, the Town's performance of this purported "tort law" cannot be compelled 
through mandamus. The Town provides no basis either for its characterization of the duty to 
maintain as merely a tort law or for its conclusion that as such, performance cannot be 
compelled through mandamus. In fact, the only basis the Town provides in support of its 
argument is that "chaos" would result if private citizens were "suddenly free to petition the 
court for a writ compelling a municipality to affirmatively act as that citizen desires, based 
on any one of the innumerable 'duties' which can form the basis of a negligence claim." 
Appellee's Brief at p. 28. Even then, the Town fails to explain how or why this supposed 
"chaos" would ensue if this Court were to grant the relief sought by Appellants. 
1 / 
Appellant's demonstrated in their Opening Brief that numerous jurisdictions have 
concluded that the duty to maintain is the type of duty that a court can enforce through 
mandamus. Rather than attack the principal, the Town attempts to distinguish the cases 
relied upon by Appellants from the present action by arguing that in each of the cases the 
duty to maintain was contained in a statute rather than the common law. Apparently, by 
raising this distinction, the Town is asserting that mandamus cannot be used to enforce a 
common law duty. Even if the Court were to find that Utah statutes impose no mandatory 
duty to maintain on municipalities, the Town fails, however, to point to any case decided 
either by a Utah court or any other jurisdiction wherein it was held that only statutory duties 
may be enjoined through mandamus. In fact, this Court and numerous other courts have 
repeatedly held that mandamus can be used to compel performance of a common law duty. 
For example, in State v. Ogden Rapid Transit Co., 112 P. 120 (Utah 1910), which 
Appellants cite in their Opening Brief and the Town completely ignores, this Court held that 
it is "beyond question" that a court possesses the power to "coerce" the discharge of a duty 
imposed by solely by the common law where it is clear that such common law duty is 
mandatory {i.e. performance of such duty may be compelled). Id. at 124.1 
1
 While the Court ultimately concluded in Sheet that a court did not possess the authority to 
control the particular type of activity which plaintiff argued the defendant had owed a duty 
under the common law to perform, the Court reiterated that other common law duties such 
as the defendant's duty, as a common carrier, not to discriminate could be compelled 
through mandamus. As demonstrated in Appellants' Opening Brief, numerous courts have 
held that a municipality's duty to maintain its streets in a safe condition is a duty that can be 
enforced through mandamus-type relief. See, e.g., Lank v. Hughes, 167 A.2d 268, 286-87 
(Pa. 1961); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Sutton, 119 P. 423, 428 (Okla. 1911). 
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Many other jurisdictions have also long maintained that common law duties may be 
enforced by mandamus. See, e.g., Kansas v. Lake Koen Navigation, Reservoir & Irr. Co., 65 
P. 681, 682 (Kan. 1901) (holding that "if the performance of a duty is enjoined by law, 
either by express statutory enactment or by the rules of the common law, its performance 
may be compelled by mandamus" and concluding that it could compel performance of a 
common law duty, existing "independently of statutory provisions," to repair a damaged 
highway to accommodate public travel); City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission, 676 A.2d 1298, 1305-06 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), petition for allowance of appeal 
denied, 546 Pa. 657, 684 A.2d 558, cert, denied, 520 U.S. 1115 (1997) (holding that the 
common law duty to maintain and repair a highway the railroad bridges crossing overhead 
was imposed to "enable the public to safely use the highway" and as an "imperative" duty 
"could be enforced by mandamus."); see also Copeland v. Huff, 261 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Ark. 
1953) (holding that "mandamus lies to enforce a clear legal righty whether it arises by 
statute or by common law'') (emphasis added); Southern Bell Tel & Tel Co. v. Beach, 8 
Ga. App. 720, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911) (finding that mandamus may be used to compel 
performance by a telephone company of "its common-law duty" to not discriminate when 
such duty is breached). 
The Town also argues that Appellants, in demonstrating in their Opening Brief that 
mandamus has routinely been recognized and employed as an appropriate means to compel 
performance of the duty to maintain, fail to cite any authority relevant to this matter because, 
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according to the Town, "in each case" cited by Appellants "a state statute created [the] 
mandatory duty." See Appellee's Brief at p. 26, n. 6 (emphasis added). The Town's 
argument is inaccurate and misleading. Significantly, the Town ignores, as it must, the 
Jamison v. City ofZion, 834 N.E.2d 499 (111. Ct. App. 2005) case, which, as described by 
Appellants in their Opening Brief, held that a "mandamus type action was proper to compel 
a city to fulfill its common-law duty to remove obstruction from a city roadway." Appellants 
Opening Brief at p. 20. Given the Town's position that common law duties are not 
enforceable through mandamus, Appellants believe that a more extensive description of the 
Jamison decision is necessary. 
In Jamison, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant city after the city failed 
to require his neighbor to remove their lilac bushes, which the plaintiff claimed created a 
dangerous condition by blocking motorists' view of oncoming traffic on the road the 
plaintiff used to access his home. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus against the city 
compelling it to perform (i) its duty to abate the encroachment under the city's nuisance 
ordinance and the Illinois criminal nuisance statute and (ii) its common law duty to remove 
dangerous obstructions from its roads. After the district court dismissed the plaintiffs 
action, holding that any duty the city owed to plaintiff was discretionary, the plaintiff 
appealed. 
On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision with 
regards to the city ordinance, finding the appearance of the term "may" therein meant that 
20 
the city's duty to abate an encroachment was discretionary. Id. at 501. The Court also 
agreed with the district court that the city owed the plaintiff no duty under the state criminal 
nuisance statute because the state's attorney, not the city, had the authority to prosecute the 
crime of nuisance. Id. The Court, however, disagreed with the district court's decision that 
the city's "common-law duty to remove obstructions from the roadway" was discretionary. 
Id. 
In particular, the Court found that it was "[l]ong-settled case law" that a city "has a 
mandatory, rather than discretionary, duty to remove [ ] obstruction^] from [its roads]" and 
that "courts have long held that an action for mandamus will lie to compel a municipality to 
discharge its duty to remove purprestures and obstructions from public streets." Id. at 503, 
citing Mamolella v. First Bank of Oak Park, 423 N.E.2d 204 (111. Ct. App. 1981). The Court 
then quoted the Illinois Supreme Court's explanation of the source of this duty: 
When a public highway is once established all the beneficial uses of it vest in 
and devolve upon the public, and where, as in incorporated cities, the title to 
the streets is vested in the municipality, they are nevertheless charged with the 
public right. . . The city could have no authority to accept public streets upon 
any other conditions than that they should be for public use, and what is meant 
by public use is that the public shall have the uninterrupted, unimpeded and 
unobstructed use of every portion and part of such public highway. 
Id., quoting People ex rel. Faulkner v. Harris, 67 N.E. 785 (1903). 
It is also important to note that in addition to the Court's express acknowledgment in 
Skeet that common law duties may be enforced through mandamus, Appellants have been 
unable to find a single decision by this Court in which it held that only statutory duties may 
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be compelled through mandamus. Indeed, while the Court references statutory duties from 
time to time in its decisions regarding the use of mandamus, when making a pronouncement 
of which duties may be enforced by mandamus under Utah law, the Court has stated only 
that the duty must be a clear "legal," "nondiscretionary" duty "imposed" or "required by 
law." See, e.g., Renn v. Utah State Bd of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995) 
(Mandamus is "designed to compel a person to perform a legal duty incumbent on him by 
virtue of his office or as required by law. . . Mandamus is "available to compel the 
performance of a nondiscretionary duty'") (emphasis added); Harris v. Turner, 96 Utah 
342, 347 (Utah 1938) ("Whenever action by a court or other officer is sought to be 
compelled by mandamus, it must be shown that there is a clear legal duty to act as 
requested. The duty to so act must be clear, free from doubt, imperative, and without 
discretion to act or refuse.") (emphasis added). It is beyond dispute that the duty to maintain 
clearly meets this definition and, therefore, mandamus is available to compel its 
performance. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
contains language that clearly demonstrates Utah courts have the authority to order that a 
municipality, among others, perform both the statutory duties and the common law duties 
imposed on such municipality. In particular, Rule 65B(d) which sets forth the grounds for 
relief under the Rule in circumstances related to, among other things, the "failure to comply 
with duty," reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
(d)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) [...]; (B) 
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where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has 
failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) 
[...]; or (D) where the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its 
jurisdiction or failed to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory 
law. 
U.R.C.P., Rule 65B(d)(2). 
Thus, relief is available under subsection (d)(2) of Rule 65B where a municipality 
(i.e. a "corporation") has "failed to perform an act required by law as a duty." See 
U.R.C.P., Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Subsection (d)(2)(D), however, contains a 
far more restrictive basis for relief than that set forth in subsection (d)(2)(B), in that the 
availability of relief under subsection (d)(2)(D) is expressly limited to the Board of Pardons 
and Parole's failure to perform "an act required by constitutional or statutory law" rather 
than "an act required by law" See U.R.C.P., Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) and (D) (emphasis added). 
Had this Court, at the time it drafted Rule 65B, intended that only duties imposed on a 
municipality by statute, rather than the common law, provide a basis for relief under 
subsection (d)(2)(B) in the event that the municipality fails to perform such statutory duty, 
the Court could have simply included that limitation in the language it chose for Rule 65B. 
This is evidenced by the fact that this Court included precisely such a limitation in 
subsection (d)(2)(D). 
Accordingly, subsection (d)(2)(B)'s language, which provides that a failure by a 
municipality to perform any act "required by law as a duty" constitutes a basis for relief 
under Rule 65B (as opposed to subsection (d)(2)(D)'s language, which expressly limits the 
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availability of relief to the Board's failure to perform only actions "required by 
constitutional or statutory law"), further disproves the Town's argument that mandamus-type 
relief is only available to compel a municipality to perform its statutory duties and that 
mandamus is not available to compel performance of common law duties. 
V. THE TOWN'S CLAIM REGARDING ITS FINANCES IS NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT AND, IN ANY EVENT, DISINGENUOUS. 
As its final argument, the Town asserts that even if Utah law imposed a mandatory 
duty on it to maintain its road in a safe condition, the Town cannot be compelled to perform 
this duty because it lacks the funds to do so. The Town's argument is misplaced for two 
independent reasons. 
First, the record for this matter before the Court contains no evidence or finding by 
the Trial Court that the Town does, in fact, lack the funds to perform its mandatory duty to 
maintain. The record is silent as to this issue because the Town presented no evidence 
during either the preliminary injunction hearing or the trial of this matter and, indeed, failed 
to even allege, that it lacked the funds to repair the Road. Even now, the only support for 
the Town's claim, is its bald assertion that it lacks the funds. Because the Town failed to 
make any attempt to demonstrate that it lacks the funds to perform its duty to maintain, and 
as a result, the record in this case is silent as to such issue, the Town cannot, for the first 
time, present its argument regarding its purported lack of funds to the Court on appeal. 
Accordingly, the issue is not before the Court. 
Second, the Town's claim that it lacks the funds to repair the Road is belied and 
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negated by the undisputed fact that the Appellants repeatedly offered to pay for all necessary 
repairs to the Road. While the Town will undoubtedly argue that Appellants offered only to 
pay for repairs to the Road that did not meet the recommendations of the Town's engineer, 
this argument is also disingenuous given the fact that the Trial Court found that the Town 
permitted the contractor, who submitted the estimate in Appellants' offer, to perform 
precisely the same type of repairs to a portion of the Road as those for which Appellants had 
offered to pay and that such repairs had held up "remarkably well." The Town cannot, in 
good faith, argue that it lacks the funds necessary to perform its duty to maintain the Road in 
a safe and useable condition, when it flatly rejected repeated offers in amounts sufficient to 
have covered the costs of repairs which had they been conducted, would have returned the 
Road to a safe and useable condition. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and those contained in Appellants' Opening 
Brief, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's decision that it lacked the authority to 
compel the Town to perform its legal duty to repair and maintain the Road in a safe and 
useable condition. 
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